作者：朱美聪律师     2016-12-28

一、公司董事的含义及其义务产生的理论基础

公司董事的定义 董事是公司股东选举出来的决策者及公司业务的管理者。《牛津法律大词典》将董事定义为:是公司股东选举出来的决策者及主管公司业务的管理者。《布莱克法律大词典》的定义是:根据法律被任命或选举并授权管理和经营公司事务的人。英国1985年《公司法》第741条第1款将公司董事界定为:处于董事地位的任何人，不管其称谓如何，例如管理董事、行政长官或者董事会、经理成员均是。新修订的2006年《公司法》在其第250条对公司董事作了与1985年《公司法》相同的界定。新公司法在修订过程中没有对规定非常简单的董事定义作进一步详细的规定主要是：为了保证有关公司董事的法律规定对所有实际在公司里掌握经营管理权的人均能适用，尤其是那些在公司里能够作出决定的人。根据英国公司法的界定，董事具体应当包括以下人员：

（1）由公司授权任命的执行董事；

（2）由公司授权任命的非执行董事；

（3） 一名事实上的董事（指虽然没有被公司通过任何途径授权任命，但事实上占据了董事地位并履行董事职能的人。

董事义务产生的理论基础  董事义务制度的立法设计，首先应当明确董事与公司关系的性质，这也就是董事义务产生的理论基础。董事在英美公司法中具有双重法律地位，这是由英美判例法所确立的。早在十九世纪中期，美国法学家凯恩就指出：“一个对外招股的公司董事，其法律地位是什么？他们不过是公司的代理人。公司本身不能由自己来进行活动……它只能通过董事来进行活动。因而，只要是代理人应承担责任的场合，董事就应该承担责任。”法官罗米丽指出：“董事是被选任来为公司股东之利益而管理公司事务的人。它为一种受信托义务,该种义务一旦承担,董事就必须充分地、全面地履行好该义务……。”因此,在英美公司法中,董事既是公司的代理人,也是公司的受信托人,“是公司钱财的受信托人,是为公司利益代表公司从事交易活动的代理人。”在现代英美有关公司的判例法和制定法中,董事的双重法律地位仍然得到了广泛的承认和尊重。

二、英国公司董事义务制度的最新改革

公司董事义务制度的最新改革历程 公司董事义务制度作为公司法中的重要内容之一，伴随着英国公司法的发展长期以来也不断的适时作出修改，比较完善。但英国有关董事义务的规定由于传统方面的原因均分散的规定在判例法中，且许多规定不够明确，这样既不利于董事了解和履行自己的义务，也不便于公司监督董事们履行好义务。因而公司董事义务制度在最新一次英国公司法重大修订中也进行了相应的改革。1998年3月,英国贸工部(Department of Trade and Industry,DTI)发布了名为《公司法现代化与竞争经济》(Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy)的咨询意见书，启动公司法的全面改革。此次公司法改革被称为是英国公司法150多年来最全面、最深入的一次改革。此后三年间，以英国贸工部(Department of Trade and Industry,DTI)的名义发布了许多审查报告，分专题对公司法改革的热点和难点问题进行了审查。作为审查报告的回应，英国政府分别于2002年7月和2005年公布了名为《公司法的现代化》（modernizing Company Law）和《公司法改革白皮书》(Company Law Reform White Paper),提出了全面改革公司制度以适应现代企业的需要的政府意见，并向社会公开咨询意见。在充分公开咨询意见后，公司法改革法案(Company Law Reform Bill 2005)提交国会审议，经过了长达八年的激烈争论，公司法最终于2006 年11 月8 日获得了王室批准（RoyalAssent），完成了最后的立法程序，新公司法被称为“2006 年公司法”（the Companies Act 2006）。这次公司法改革的主要方面有：为小公司设置更灵活并易于解读的法律制度；强化股东在公司治理中的积极作用；降低公司运营成本等，其中将公司董事义务与职责纳入成文法规定是本次公司法改革的一个重大举措。

2006年公司法有关董事义务制度的改革内容 公司法改革的一个重大举措是将董事义务的有关规定法典化。原先有关公司董事的义务规定，散见于150 多年来累积的判例法以及衡平法中，十分繁复，不利于公司董事（特别是小公司的董事）知晓和理解。新公司法几乎重述了所有的董事义务，例如董事不得使其私人利益与公司利益发生冲突、不得利用董事职权收受第三方利益等。新公司法第154 条明确指出，该法规定的董事义务是建立在判例法规则以及衡平法原则基础上，而且应当按照现有的判例法及衡平法进行解释。此外，该法第 162 条进一步规定，违反该法义务的法律后果应当与判例法及衡平法中确立的法律责任相一致。同时,法案中引入了“合理的股东价值”(enlightened shareholder value)的概念,要求董事的责任应建立在“合理的股东价值”(enlightened shareholder value)的基础之上,即董事应以股东利益的最大化为目标。因为,只有这样,才能最大限度地提升公司的竞争能力,并进而增加整个社会的财富和福利。但是,如果公司的董事们仅注重短期的财务目标,忽视长期关系的建立,前述目标则不可能达到。为此,法案要求董事在决策时恰当地处理好包括公司与雇员、消费者、供货商以及社区等在内的方方面面的利益关系。因为只有这样，才能最终实现全体股东利益的最大化。

三、英国2006年公司法中规定的董事主要义务

英国于2006年11月8日获得女皇批准通过的公司法以成文法的方式规定了董事的义务，内容包括长期以来创建的受托义务和普通法规定的注意和具备一定技能的义务，公司法在第170条到181条规定了公司董事的七种主要义务。

1.在授权范围内履行职责的义务

这个义务规定在2006年公司法的第171条，根据这条规定，董事应当根据其被授予的权力范围来履行职责，履行职责要符合适当的目的。至于什么是适当的目的必须在具体的情况下经过的分析才能确定。这个义务要求董事遵从公司的宪章，即根据公司章程作出决定；或者根据公司股东的决议作出决定，且这个股东的决议必须是代表了公司的意愿，例如全部股东确实都同意的非正式的表决的决议，或者根据法律股东的决议代表了公司的决定的情况。

2.促进公司走向“成功”的义务

这个义务规定在公司法的第172条，这是一个从最根本的善管原则发展而来的新的原则，该义务要求董事根据公司的最大利益做出决议。新公司法规定了董事必须从最有可能促进公司成功的目的出发履行自己的职责。虽然这个义务的主体应当是作为整体的董事会，但当履行这个义务时，董事需要考虑第172条所非详尽列举的各种情况，包括考虑公司职工的利益；与供应商之间的关系；与顾客的关系；以及董事决定作出后对公司所在社区和周围环境的影响，同时要考虑让公司维持一个高标准的商业声誉；公司内部各股东之间利益的公平性。该义务还明确规定了董事在作出决定的过程中要更多的考虑了公司的社会责任。

至于什么样才是“公司的成功”在公司法中并没有被定义，DIT的指导性说明中建议成功应当与商业公司长期的持续发展联系在一起。这一义务还要求董事作出决定时，如果各种利益发生冲突时董事要综合考虑并平衡各种因素后决定。同时该规定还认为：为了明确董事这个义务的执行状况，董事作出决议的过程应当由会议纪要进行记载，会议纪要对说明董事是否在决议过程中是否充分的履行了该义务非常重要，

3.独立的作出决定的义务

新公司法第173条规定了董事的一个积极性义务即作出决定必须要独立的进行，这个义务的具体含义包括两部份内容：首先一个董事首先必须作出决定，其次才是在作出决定时应当是独立的。表面上看，这条规定将影响到所谓的那些在管理中不主动履行职责惯于让别人去做决定的董事，但稍加分析可以得出这个义务会真正会影响到影子董事的权利。因为如果每个董事都独立的进行决定后，那么影子董事权力的行驶将不再会再有太多的空间。这条义务是在修改过程中有较大争议，但辩论和争议的过程中政府意见非常明确即要在公司法中规定该条义务。

4.董事在履行职务时应当要具有合理谨慎，技能和勤奋的义务

这条义务规定在公司法的第174条，这个义务要求董事在履行职务时应当要具有合理的谨慎、技能和勤奋。意思就是公司董事必须具有（1）人们可以合理地期待与履行同样职责之人的一般知识、技能和经验。（2）该董事所具有的一般知识、技能和经验。

5.避免董事私人利益与公司利益发生冲突的义务

这个义务规定在公司法的175条，具体内容包括（1）一个公司的董事必须避免他私人具有或可能具有的利益（包括直接或间接利益）与公司利益发生冲突或可能发生冲突的情形发生。所冲突的利益应当包括公司的任何财产、信息和机会，（而不论公司是否真的能从这些财产、信息和机会中获得好处）。利益冲突不包括公司交易和事务执行过程中才出现的利益冲突。

董事利益冲突义务在以下两种情况下可以免除：董事如果根据形势判断无法合理的得出会有利益冲突情形发生或者有利益冲突的董事已经将相关工作授权给别人履行了。将职责授权给他人履行应当符合一定的条件：即如果在私人公司里公司宪章里没有规定此类授权是无效的，类似的事情被公司董事建议或授权；如果是公有公司则其公司章程里需有允许公司董事授权的规定，公司董事根据公司章程的规定进行了授权和建议。 这个义务所规定的不得有利益冲突还包括义务冲突的情形。

6．不得利用董事身份从第三方收取利益的义务

这个义务规定在公司法的第176条，具体是要求一个公司董事不得因其具有董事身份或他正在执行董事职责而接受任何第三方给予的利益。第三方指除董事任职公司之外的公司或者公司集团或者代表公司或公司集团履行职务的任何个人。利益包括金钱利益和非金钱利益。然而，如果接受该利益不能被认为与公司的利益有冲突，则不会构成对该义务的违反。

7．在公司拟进行的交易和安排中披露利益的义务

这个义务规定在公司法的第177条。要求公司董事如果在公司拟进行的交易或工作安排中有直接或间接的私人利益。他必须向公司的其他董事揭露其私人利益。披露私人利益应当在董事会上作出或者通过法律规定的通知等方式作出。如果披露的内容被认为是不准确或不完整的，董事将被要求做进一步的披露。任何披露应当在公司进入交易和工作安排之前作出。

但披露义务不适用：1、公司董事确实没有意识到在交易和工作安排中其具有私人利益或者董事根本对拟进行的交易和工作安排不知情； 2、公司董事不能合理的得出拟进行的交易和安排与自己私人利益会存在冲突；3、公司的其他董事已经知道该利益冲突存在，或者应当知道利益冲突的存在，或者该事项已经在董事会会议上讨论过或者根据公司章程的规定被董事会授权的委员会讨论过。

四、英国公司董事义务制度的优越性和对完善我国董事义务制度的启示

董事义务制度的优越性 英国公司法尤其是2006年公司法中所规定的董事义务制度充分体现了英国公司法越来越明确并加强董事义务的趋势，体现了英国公司法修订过程中所提倡的“弘扬股东权利，呼唤股东权利的回归”的精神。也就是公司法修改白皮书中所称的“增强股东参与和一个长期的投资文化。”公司法在修改过程中，修改小组也曾明确提出董事的基本目标是为了公司成员的利益取得公司的成功。董事制度的设计及改革完全符合了现代公司发展和改善英国投资环境的需要。在经济全球化竞争的背景下,商业和投资越来越依赖全球条件决定,哪里对投资者保护越充分,资本就流向哪里，英国公司法如此注重强化公司董事义务，实际上就是增强对股东权利的保护,目的也在于“在设立和经营企业方面,保持英国是世界上对投资者（股东）最有吸引力的地方的地位”。

对完善我国董事义务制度的启示 随着我国经济的快速发展，公司的规模越来越大，越来越多的公司实行所有权和经营权分离,公司由股东所选择的代理人———董事从事公司经营。股东是公司的所有者,董事是股东的代理人,理论上,代理人应为委托人的利益而工作,但董事亦为一合理之“经济人”,亦会以自身利益为考量,自有可能因此为反于公司利益或股东利益之决策、行动。近年来我国股份有限公司中公司经营者内部人控制局面十分严重，经营者权力扩张，缺乏有效监督，也爆发了许多大公司（尤其是上市公司）董事会操纵公司侵害公司和股东利益的丑闻,极大地挫伤了投资者的积极性,从而也从根本上影响到经济的发展。我国当前公司法虽然也有公司董事义务的相关规定，但这些规定不够系统全面，且在程序上缺乏操作性。因此，我们应当深入研究、借鉴英国有关董事义务的立法经验，在今后的相关立法中，有意识的将英国公司法改革中一些先进理念运用在具体工作中，借此推动立法质量的提高。同时在制定公司董事义务具体制度方面，要将相关制度做实、作深、避免规则流于形式，难以执行，从而影响法律的权威性和公信力。

Author: Lawyer Zhu Meicong, December 28, 2016

1、 The Meaning of Company Directors and the Theoretical Basis for Their Obligations

The definition of a company director is that a director is the decision-maker elected by the company's shareholders and the manager of the company's business. The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines directors as decision-makers elected by the shareholders of a company and managers in charge of the company's business. The definition of the Black Law Dictionary is: a person appointed or elected and authorized by law to manage and operate the affairs of a company. Article 741 (1) of the 1985 Companies Act in the UK defines a company director as any person in the position of a director, regardless of their title, such as a managing director, chief executive, or a member of the board of directors or managers. The newly revised 2006 Company Law provides the same definition of company directors in Article 250 as the 1985 Company Law. The new company law did not provide further detailed provisions for the very simple definition of directors in the revision process, mainly to ensure that the legal provisions related to company directors are applicable to all individuals who actually hold management power in the company, especially those who can make decisions in the company. According to the definition of British company law, directors should specifically include the following personnel:

(1) An executive director appointed by authorization from the company;

(2) Non executive directors appointed by the company's authorization;

(3) A de facto director (referring to a person who, although not authorized by the company through any means, actually holds the position of a director and performs the functions of a director).

The theoretical basis for the emergence of director obligations The legislative design of the director obligation system should first clarify the nature of the relationship between directors and the company, which is the theoretical basis for the emergence of director obligations. Directors have a dual legal status in Anglo American company law, which is established by Anglo American case law. As early as the mid-19th century, American jurist Kane pointed out, "What is the legal status of a company's directors who offer shares to the public? They are just agents of the company. The company itself cannot carry out activities by itself... it can only carry out activities through directors. Therefore, as long as the agent is responsible, the director should bear responsibility." Judge Romeli pointed out: A director is a person appointed to manage the affairs of a company for the benefit of its shareholders. It is a fiduciary obligation, and once this obligation is fulfilled, the director must fully and comprehensively fulfill it... "Therefore, in Anglo American company law, a director is both the agent and trustee of the company, The dual legal status of a director is still widely recognized and respected in modern Anglo American case law and statutory law regarding companies, as it is the trustee of the company's finances and the agent representing the company in trading activities for the benefit of the company.

2、 The Latest Reform of the Obligation System of Directors in British Companies

The latest reform process of the company director obligation system As one of the important contents of company law, the company director obligation system has been constantly revised and improved in a timely manner with the development of British company law for a long time. However, due to traditional reasons, the provisions on director obligations in the UK are scattered in case law, and many provisions are not clear enough. This is not conducive to directors understanding and fulfilling their obligations, nor is it convenient for companies to supervise directors to fulfill their obligations. Therefore, the obligation system of company directors has also undergone corresponding reforms in the latest major revision of the UK Company Law. In March 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of the United Kingdom issued an advisory opinion titled 'Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy', initiating a comprehensive reform of company law. This company law reform is known as the most comprehensive and in-depth reform of British company law in over 150 years. In the following three years, under the name of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the UK, many review reports were released, examining the hot and difficult issues of company law reform in different topics. As a response to the review report, the British government released the "Modernizing Company Law" and "Company Law Reform White Paper" in July 2002 and 2005 respectively, proposing government opinions on comprehensive reform of the company system to meet the needs of modern enterprises, and publicly consulting opinions to the society. After thorough public consultation, the Company Law Reform Bill 2005 was submitted to Congress for review. After eight years of intense debate, the company law was finally approved by the Royal Assent on November 8, 2006, completing the final legislative process. The new company law is known as the "Companies Act 2006". The main aspects of this company law reform include: establishing a more flexible and easy to interpret legal system for small companies; Strengthen the positive role of shareholders in corporate governance; Reducing the operating costs of the company, among which incorporating the obligations and responsibilities of the company's directors into the statutory provisions is a major measure of this company law reform.

A major measure of the reform of the Company Law in 2006 was to codify the relevant provisions on director obligations. The original regulations on the obligations of company directors were scattered in case law and equity law accumulated over 150 years, which were very complex and not conducive to the knowledge and understanding of company directors (especially those of small companies). The new company law almost restates all director obligations, such as directors not allowing their personal interests to conflict with the interests of the company, and not using their powers to accept third-party interests. Article 154 of the New Company Law clearly states that the obligations of directors under the law are based on case law rules and equity principles, and should be interpreted in accordance with existing case law and equity. In addition, Article 162 of the law further stipulates that the legal consequences of violating obligations under the law should be consistent with the legal liability established in case law and equity. At the same time, the bill introduces the concept of "enlighted shareholder value", requiring directors to establish their responsibilities on the basis of "enlighted shareholder value", that is, directors should aim to maximize shareholder interests. Because only in this way can we maximize the company's competitiveness and thereby increase the wealth and welfare of the entire society. However, if the company's directors only focus on short-term financial goals and neglect the establishment of long-term relationships, the aforementioned goals cannot be achieved. To this end, the bill requires directors to properly handle all aspects of interest relationships, including the company and employees, consumers, suppliers, and the community, when making decisions. Because only in this way can we ultimately achieve the maximization of the interests of all shareholders.

3、 Main Obligations of Directors under the UK Companies Act 2006

The Company Law of the United Kingdom, approved by the Queen on November 8, 2006, sets out the obligations of directors in written form, including the long-standing fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill required by common law. The Company Law sets out seven main obligations of company directors in Articles 170 to 181.

1. Obligation to fulfill responsibilities within the scope of authorization

This obligation is stipulated in Article 171 of the 2006 Company Law, according to which directors shall perform their duties within the scope of their delegated powers, and the performance of their duties shall be in accordance with appropriate purposes. As for what is the appropriate purpose, it must be determined through analysis in specific situations. This obligation requires directors to comply with the company's charter, which means making decisions in accordance with the company's charter; Alternatively, a decision can be made based on the resolution of the company's shareholders, which must represent the company's wishes, such as an informal voting resolution that all shareholders do agree to, or a situation where the shareholder's resolution represents the company's decision in accordance with the law.

2. The obligation to promote the company towards "success"

This obligation is stipulated in Article 172 of the Company Law, which is a new principle developed from the fundamental principle of good governance, requiring directors to make decisions based on the best interests of the company. The new company law stipulates that directors must fulfill their duties with the most likely goal of promoting the success of the company. Although the subject of this obligation should be the board of directors as a whole, when fulfilling this obligation, directors need to consider various situations not fully listed in Article 172, including considering the interests of company employees; Relationship with suppliers; Relationship with customers; And the impact of the director's decision on the company's community and surrounding environment, while also considering maintaining a high standard of commercial reputation for the company; The fairness of interests among shareholders within the company. This obligation also clearly stipulates that directors should consider the company's social responsibility more in the process of making decisions.

As for what constitutes "success of a company", it is not defined in the company law. DIT's guidance notes suggest that success should be linked to the long-term sustainable development of commercial companies. This obligation also requires directors to consider and balance various factors before making a decision in the event of a conflict of interests. At the same time, the regulation also believes that in order to clarify the execution status of the director's obligation, the process of making a resolution by the director should be recorded in the minutes of the meeting, which is very important for indicating whether the director has fully fulfilled the obligation during the resolution process,

3. Obligation to make independent decisions

Article 173 of the New Company Law stipulates a proactive obligation of directors to make decisions independently. The specific meaning of this obligation includes two parts: firstly, a director must make a decision first, and secondly, when making a decision, they should be independent. On the surface, this regulation will affect the so-called directors who do not actively fulfill their responsibilities in management and are accustomed to letting others make decisions, but a little analysis shows that this obligation will truly affect the rights of shadow directors. Because if each director makes independent decisions, there will no longer be too much room for the exercise of shadow director power. This obligation was subject to significant controversy during the revision process, but during the debate and controversy, the government's opinion was very clear that it should be stipulated in the Company Law.

4. Directors should have the obligation of reasonable prudence, skill, and diligence in performing their duties

This obligation is stipulated in Article 174 of the Company Law, which requires directors to exercise reasonable prudence, skills, and diligence in the performance of their duties. The meaning is that a company director must possess (1) general knowledge, skills, and experience that people can reasonably expect and perform the same duties as a person. (2) The general knowledge, skills, and experience possessed by the director.

5. Obligation to avoid conflicts between the personal interests of directors and the interests of the company

This obligation is stipulated in Article 175 of the Company Law, which specifically includes (1) a director of a company must avoid situations where his personal or potential interests (including direct or indirect interests) conflict or may conflict with the interests of the company. The conflicting interests should include any property, information, and opportunities of the company (regardless of whether the company can truly benefit from these properties, information, and opportunities). Conflicts of interest do not include conflicts of interest that only arise during company transactions and the execution of affairs.

The obligation of a director to have a conflict of interest can be waived in two situations: if a director cannot reasonably determine based on the situation that there will be a conflict of interest, or if a director with a conflict of interest has already authorized others to perform the relevant work. Authorizing responsibilities to others should meet certain conditions: that is, if there is no provision in the company charter in a private company that such authorization is invalid, similar matters are recommended or authorized by the company's directors; If it is a public company, there must be provisions in its articles of association that allow the authorization of the company's directors. The company's directors have authorized and made suggestions in accordance with the provisions of the articles of association. This obligation stipulates that there shall be no conflict of interest and includes situations of conflict of obligations.

6. Obligation not to use the director's identity to collect benefits from third parties

This obligation is stipulated in Article 176 of the Company Law, which specifically requires that a director of a company shall not accept any benefits from any third party due to his status as a director or the fact that he is performing his duties as a director. Third party refers to any company or group of companies, or any individual acting on behalf of the company or group of companies, other than the company in which the director serves. Benefits include both monetary and non monetary benefits. However, if accepting this interest cannot be considered as conflicting with the company's interests, it will not constitute a breach of the obligation.

7. Obligation to disclose interests in transactions and arrangements proposed by the company

This obligation is stipulated in Article 177 of the Company Law. Require company directors to have a direct or indirect personal interest in the proposed transaction or work arrangement of the company. He must disclose his personal interests to other directors of the company. The disclosure of personal interests shall be made at the board of directors or through legal notices or other means. If the disclosure is deemed inaccurate or incomplete, the directors will be required to make further disclosures. Any disclosure should be made before the company enters into transactions and work arrangements.

But the disclosure obligation does not apply: 1. The company's directors do not realize that they have a personal interest in the transaction and work arrangements, or that the directors are not aware of the proposed transaction and work arrangements; 2. The directors of the company cannot reasonably conclude that the proposed transactions and arrangements will conflict with their personal interests; 3. The other directors of the company are already aware of the existence of the conflict of interest, or should be aware of the existence of the conflict of interest, or the matter has been discussed at a board meeting or by a committee authorized by the board of directors in accordance with the provisions of the company's articles of association.

4、 The Advantages of the UK Company Director Obligation System and Its Enlightenment for Improving China's Director Obligation System

The superiority of the director obligation system in the UK Company Law, especially the director obligation system stipulated in the 2006 Company Law, fully reflects the trend of increasingly clear and strengthened director obligations in the UK Company Law, and reflects the spirit of "promoting shareholder rights and calling for the return of shareholder rights" advocated in the revision process of the UK Company Law. In the white paper on the revision of the Company Law, it is referred to as "enhancing shareholder participation and a long-term investment culture." During the revision process of the Company Law, the revision group also explicitly stated that the basic goal of directors is to achieve the success of the company for the benefit of its members. The design and reform of the board of directors system fully meet the needs of modern company development and improving the investment environment in the UK. In the context of economic globalization and competition, business and investment are increasingly dependent on global conditions to determine where investors are protected, and capital flows. The UK company law places such emphasis on strengthening the obligations of company directors, which in fact enhances the protection of shareholder rights. The goal is also to "maintain the UK's position as the most attractive place for investors (shareholders) in the world in establishing and operating enterprises".

The inspiration for improving the director's obligation system in China. With the rapid development of China's economy, the size of companies is increasing, and more and more companies are implementing the separation of ownership and management rights. Companies are operated by the agent chosen by shareholders - the director. Shareholders are the owners of the company, and directors are the agents of shareholders. In theory, agents should work for the interests of the principal, but directors are also reasonable "economic agents" who consider their own interests and may make decisions or actions that are contrary to the interests of the company or shareholders. In recent years, the situation of insider control among the operators of limited liability companies in China has been very serious. The power of the operators has expanded, and there is a lack of effective supervision. There have also been many scandals of large companies (especially listed companies) where the board of directors manipulated the company to infringe on the interests of the company and shareholders, greatly dampening the enthusiasm of investors and fundamentally affecting economic development. Although there are relevant provisions on the obligations of company directors in China's current company law, these provisions are not systematic and comprehensive enough, and lack operability in procedures. Therefore, we should conduct in-depth research and draw on the legislative experience of director obligations in the UK. In future relevant legislation, we should consciously apply some advanced concepts from the UK company law reform to specific work, in order to promote the improvement of legislative quality. At the same time, in formulating specific systems for the obligations of company directors, it is necessary to make the relevant systems practical and in-depth, and avoid rules becoming mere formality and difficult to implement, thereby affecting the authority and credibility of the law.