论破产重整中借款融资优先权之金字塔式三层级构建

浙江利群律师事务所  林秋莹19941253008  金冬灵17681618955

摘要：借款融资作为一种通过改变负债结构而获取资金的融资模式，其优势无法比拟。但目前而言，我国现行法律对借款融资优先权的规定还过于单薄，仅规定参照共益债务可以随时清偿，既不能优先于破产费用清偿，又不能优先于共益债务清偿，这显然无法满足破产重整企业的借款融资需求。基于此，通过借鉴域外立法例、国内破产重整融资典型案例、管理人实务经验等，对我国借款融资优先权制度进行层级化设计，构建以基础优先权、特殊优先权、超级优先权逐级优先的三级金字塔模式。同时，并针对每一层级的适用情形进行严格限制，深入贯彻“重整促进”与“滥用防止”的平衡理念。

关键词：借款融资 共益债务 特殊优先权 超级优先权

一、缘起：加快构建本土化的借款融资优先权制度

近年来，我国经济处在高速发展转向高质量发展的转型期，加之全球新冠疫情影响，国内经济形势严峻，市场一片萎靡，大量房地产、建筑业等大型企业随之破产，造成农民工失业、社会资源浪费、社会生产力破坏等一系列严重后果，社会矛盾日益凸显。在此形势下，我国出台了诸多纾困政策，保障破产重整程序能够顺利引进重整投资人，从而缓解资源配置和社会矛盾压力的升级。国务院于2019年10月23日公布了《优化营商环境条例》，为努力化解“融资难融资贵”这一痼疾，开出了具体药方。随后，各地相继以地方立法形式出台营商环境条例，凝聚了地方治理智慧。其中，北京、上海两地就于2020年初，分别出台了《北京市优化营商环境条例》《上海市优化营商环境条例》，相关条文均涉及到重整融资中的资产处置问题。党的十九大报告也强调了要深化供给侧结构性改革，持续优化存量资源配置。2021年2月25日，国家发展改革委、最高人民法院等十三部委共同出台《关于推动和保障管理人在破产程序中依法履职进一步优化营商环境的意见》，提出要加大重整企业融资支持力度，银行业金融机构应当对符合国家产业政策方向、有重整价值意义等的重整企业按照市场化、法治化原则，提供最大化的信贷支持。国家一系列举措为重整融资创造了良好的营商环境，使得“政府有形之手”和“市场无形之手”相互协调配合，加快完善社会主义市场经济体制。

重整融资指的是在破产重整期间内债务人为实现重生而进行的资金融通，其在助推企业更生再造，优化营商环境，深化供给侧改革等方面具有不可替代的制度价值和现实意义。从类型化分析，重整融资包括但不限于资产融资、债权融资、股权融资。而借款融资作为债权融资的典型代表，旨在通过改变负债结构而获取资金的融资模式。其优势明显，既具财务杠杆平衡作用，又不会对企业的实际控制权产生影响。

追溯各国历史，不难发现破产法的立法理念经历了从债权人本位，到债权人和债务人利益平衡本位，再到社会本位的嬗变过程。现代破产法也不再是只关注私人权利的民商法，而具有了公法和私法关联耦合的经济法属性。赋予借款融资优先权，其本质系公平、效率抑或利益平衡。故我国在构建本土化的借款融资优先权制度时，应当兼顾三者之平衡，破除借款融资路径的阻碍，积极推进破产企业的更生再造，以法治维护社会秩序的和谐稳定。

二、我国现行借款融资优先权规则之检视

（一）借款融资优先性的法律适用

《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（以下简称《企业破产法》）第七十五条第二款规定：“在重整期间，债务人或者管理人为继续营业目的而借款的，可以为该借款设定担保。”该款并未明确新借款的法律性质和法律地位，仅表明新的借款可以享有担保权。而现实中进入破产的债务人普遍无资产可以抵押或资产上多数已经存在抵押，新设抵押权不能降低投资人的投资风险，故该款属于立法者原则性倡导。《最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国企业破产法>若干问题的规定(三)》（以下简称《破产法司法解释三》）未出台前，法院和管理人通常会采取变通做法，以引用《企业破产法》第四十二条第四项之规定赋予新的借款以共益债务的优先受偿地位。该条款规定“为债务人继续营业而应支付的劳动报酬和社会保险费用以及由此产生的其他债务”为共益债务内容之一，但新借款与劳动报酬、社会保险费有较大的属性差异，在分类上无法与之并举，长此以往容易造成司法实践中理解和适用上的不统一。为此，《破产法司法解释三》第二条明确了重整期间借款融资参照共益债务处理，并且清偿顺序劣后于担保债权。

从文义解释分析，《破产法司法解释三》第二条与《企业破产法》第七十五条第二款相比，有如下特点：

1.在时间上，该条规定的借款发生时间应当在破产申请受理后，突破了单一重整期间的范围限制，将其发生的时间从破产重整程序拓展到了破产清算、和解程序。

2.在清偿顺位上，将新的借款参照共益债务处理，赋予其清偿优先性，明确其至少优先于其他普通债权清偿。

3.在行使程序上，重整企业进行借款融资应当经过债权人会议表决，如自行管理的债务人或管理人在第一次债权人会议召开之前提出申请的，则由人民法院许可。这体现破产重整中坚决贯彻债权人意思自治和法院依法监督的原则，并且充分考虑到在召开第一次债权人会议前借款融资的紧迫程度。

（二）现行立法之不足

虽然司法解释的出台，明确和解决司法实践中亟需应对的一些问题的统一，但仍存在“历史遗留”问题未予解决，同时也带来了一些值得研究的新问题，主要有以下方面：

1.从法律属性看，借款融资是“参照”共益债务，可见共益债务本质上不包括借款融资在内。王欣新教授认为共益债务，是在破产程序中为全体债权人利益而由债务人财产负担的债务的总称。其主要有以下几个特征：第一，债务产生的时间是在人民法院受理破产申请之后；第二，负担债务的目的是为了全体债权人的共同利益；第三，可从债务人财产中随时清偿。司法解释将其与共益债务相互割裂，于立法解释上难以自恰。

2.从优先性看，借款融资优先于普通债权，但劣后于担保物权；同时也应参照共益债务的清偿顺序。但参照不等于“按照”，有学者认为这极有可能是为以市场化手段解决借款融资优先权问题打开了一扇大门，将决定权交由债权人手里，如债权人会议能够给予潜在借款融资人以更优先的地位，自然能提高重整融资可能性，也有利于降低融资成本。所以其优先性能否超越共益债务本身清偿值得探讨。

3.从时间节点看，未明确预重整程序发生借款的法律属性、清偿顺位。司法实务中，一些影响重大的破产案件在正式进入重整程序前开始探索适用预重整程序，即庭外重组和庭内重组的衔接机制，作为提高重整效率和资产保值的重要措施。我国法律法规没有对预重整程序作出专门规定，但《全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要》《全国法院破产审判工作会议纪要》等积极鼓励破产企业探索庭外重组和庭内重组的衔接机制。因此，地方法院未停止过预重整制度实践探索，比如入选2021年浙江法院破产审判十大典型案例之一的杭州东方文化园系七公司预重整转重整案，萧山法院提前介入预重整阶段的法律指导与监督工作，就债权审核、战略投资人引进方式等重大事项监督指导，以“破产不停产”的思路缓解停业带来的资产贬值问题，维护债务人的各项生产要素及重整价值。因此，预重整的重要性不亚于重整程序，故有必要在立法层面上明确预重整程序发生的借款融资法律属性、清偿顺位。

4.从程序衔接看，未明确重整失败情况下借款融资优先性的存续或消灭问题。重整计划被法院批准之后，重整企业仍可能因不能执行重整计划或不执行重整计划，而转化为破产清算程序。对于重整程序中借款融资所享受的优先权在破产清算程序中仍否续存问题，《破产企业法》未作回应。

三、金字塔式三层级借款融资优先权制度之完善路径

（一）基础优先权

基础优先权是指享有平行于共益债务优先地位的优先权。其是基于《破产企业法》将新借款债权界定为“共益债务”性质而衍生出的权利。由于借款融资参照共益债务清偿，故借款融资在清偿顺序上也优先于职工债权、社保费用、普通破产债权。虽然《破产法司法解释三》对新借款债权法律属性予以单独解释，却未从根本上解决共益债务中“由此产生的其他债务”的范畴。从扩张解释出发，《企业破产法》第四十二条第四项中“由此”可以认为是债务人为继续营业目的产生的全部合理债务；从共益债务的本质看，其符合为全体债权人利益而由债务人财产负担的债务的概念。以上分析为共益债务范围扩大提供了正当性基础，故宜在《企业破产法》第四十二条第四项中采取概括加列举的方式加以完善，明确除劳动报酬、社会保险外，新的借款以及其他债务为共益债务，更有利于法律解释的逻辑自恰。

关于预重整程序，我国法律和司法解释均未作出专门规定。但近年来，随着《深圳市中级人民民法院审理企业重整案件的工作指引（试行）》《北京破产法庭破产重整案件办理规范(试行)》等地方规范性文件的印发，越来越多的案件开始探索适用预重整程序，特别是在一些重大破产案件上发挥着显著的缓冲作用。预重整程序作为破产企业正式进入重整程序的衔接阶段，企业资金需求的迫切程度，并不亚于正式的重整程序。对此，日本《公司更生法》第128条就将共益债务的行使期间向前延伸至重整程序申请后法院裁定前的阶段。我国绝大多数中级人民法院也认为预重整融资应参照共益债务清偿，其中江苏省宿迁市中级人民法院发布《宿迁市中级人民法院关于审理预重整案件的规定(试行)》第八条规定，“预重整期间，经人民法院许可，债务人可以为继续营业而借款。受理重整申请后，该借款可以参照企业破产法第四十二条第四项的规定清偿。”由于有关预重整的相关法律规定尚未出台，参考上述二者做法，建议在符合一定的前提要件和程序要件后，预重整期间的借款融资参照共益债务优先清偿。但延长时间不得追溯至申请预重整之前，否则会导致优先权滥用问题。待各地对预重整程序的探索更为深入时，届时可根据具体情况探讨是否将预重整借款融资亦界定为共益债务。

（二）借款融资优先权的层级突破

1.特殊优先权

特殊优先权是指优先于“破产费用和其他共益债务”。破产费用和共益债务是指法院受理债务人破产裁定后发生的费用和债务，可以随时清偿。由于二者产生因素不同，破产费用是破产程序运行的前提条件，而共益债务则非必需发生，是故破产费用先于共益债务清偿。

在给予借款融资以共益债务身份下，仍然不能获得融资的，就要进行突破上一顺位优先权的可行性分析。充分考虑到此时重整企业融资的紧迫程度和必要性，可以借鉴美国的立法设计，在满足一定条件时给予其优先于“其他行政管理费用地位”的优先权。结合中国国情，“行政管理费用”在企业破产中着重指在破产申请受理后债务人产生的新增税费问题。结合管理人实务，管理人就法院受理破产申请后资产处置过程产生的新增税费问题一直与税务机关意见相左，形成僵局。有观点认为其破产程序后转让无形资产和销售不动产的所缴纳的税款属于破产费用亦或是共益债务。其忽略了《企业破产法》第四十一条中第二款“管理、变价和分配债务人财产的费用”破产费用的申请主体应当为法院指定的管理人。对于新增税收，不能一刀切，应当进行划分，只有在符合共益债务的标准下才能对其认定为共益债务。

乘府院联动机制的东风，赋予借款融资特殊优先权符合社会主义核心价值的要求和人民的利益。管理人在行使特殊优先权时应对前提条件和批准程序上做出严格限制。申请人应当证明存在以下前提：第一，借款融资对企业的持续经营是必要的且适当的；第二，赋予共益债务的优先地位仍无法获得新的融资。关于程序方面，必须经人民法院许可或债权人会议决议通过。

2.超级优先权

超级优先权系指在新借款融资体系中，相较于建设工程价款优先权或担保债权具有平等或优先地位的优先权，是真正意义上的“超级优先权”。不同于民法典第四百一十六条，其在动产抵押担保的情形下赋予价款债权以优先顺位，用价金担保物本身担保价金担保物价金的给付，实现形式担保观和实质担保观的共生。而新借款融资体系中的超级优先权，其原型来自于《美国联邦破产法》第364条（d）款，并在基础上加以完善：第一，在债权性质上，不属于买卖合同中动产抵押物的价款债权，而是基于借款融资产生的资金债权；第二，在优先顺位上，包括但不限于动产抵押担保，是与在先建设工程价款优先权或者担保债权具有同等顺位或者具有更优先地位；第三，在适用领域上，仅限在破产程序中。

建设工程价款优先权是我国特殊规定，旨在保护广大农民工的劳动利益，优先于已有全部债权受偿。而担保债权则劣后于建设工程价款受偿，二者在清偿顺位上均优先于破产费用、共益债务以及其他普通债权。超级优先权的存在打破在前总括担保人的垄断地位，有助于鼓励借款融资因此引入该制度有其现实性和正当性。但直接赋予借款融资超级优先权地位必定会破坏我国现行法秩序，应当谨慎适用。只有满足实质要件和程序要件的情形下才能间接尝试赋予其超级优先权。实质要件含以下方面：第一、申请人需证明破产企业无法以任何其他方式获得融资；第二、充分保护原有担保债权和建筑工程价款优先权人的权益，并保留其因优先权利受损而申诉的权利和途径。此外，在实现超级优先权过程中产生的破产费用或共益债务，在清偿顺位上应当优先于借款融资。理由在于，此类破产费用或共益债务是实现超级优先权之必需，若不优先清偿，则将会被转嫁至其余债权人，降低债权清偿比例，如此有失公允。

新的借款设定抵押担保的，仍应当遵循我国物权担保规则，即“登记在先，权利在先”。由此可见，超级优先权与我国既有的抵押担保物权制度存在诸多方面的利益冲突，其不仅会大幅降低动产担保交易的信用水平，而且还人为地动摇动产担保交易的法律权威。故不建议将新担保置于在先担保平等地位甚至于优先地位。然而，重整企业确有借款融资必要的，就如何平衡好新旧担保权的利益冲突问题，我国法律法规没有涉及。以公平与效率原则为出发点，我国司法实务逐渐探索出了变通方案，在典型的房地产重整案件中，债务人通常无净资产可供抵押或抵押金额不能覆盖出借款项，投资人为获得优先受偿权就必须处理掉在先抵押担保，即通过先行收购抵押权行为，能在其出资前后均达到担保债权优先的目的。需要阐明的是，抵押权收购行为作为一种纯商业行为，不受法律所禁止。合同双方在达成合意的基础上，既能有效保障了原有担保债权的优先性，又能平衡借款融资人的利益。因此，收购抵押权行为相当于法律意义上的债权让与，在效果层面上未突破现行法律框架，在制度层面上也能体现新借款债权优先于原担保债权的存在价值。

对于是否超越在先的建设工程价款权优先受偿问题，浙江省衢州市衢江区人民法院曾在审理Y房产公司破产重整案中便创设性地将新的借款优先于抵押权于建设工程价款优先权，但其为《破产法司法解释三》出台前为解决现实问题的变通做法，参考价值有限。《破产法司法解释三》的出台打破了类案复刻的可行性通道，但通过优先权位阶的追及，并通过协商以权利让渡的方式突破在先优先权层级，亦不失为一种新探索。在法官、管理人的共同协助下，与建设工程优先权人先行协商，在一定借款融资额度范围内退让其优先权，如其上还存在抵押权的，借款融资人则可收在先购抵押权，以“双优先”方式最终实现借款融资层级类比超级优先权的效果。

（三）借款融资优先权在破产程序流转中的存续问题

《破产法立法指南》一书中，联合国国际贸易法委员认为在重整转清算程序中撤销为新贷款提供的任何担保或优先权可能不利于重整的启动，并建议各国破产法应规定在重整程序转换为清算的情况下，继续确认来自重整期间新贷款的任何优先权。美国《联邦破产法》第364条（e）存在类似规定，对于提供贷款的善意实体，此期间发生的任何债权优先权或抵押担保权的法律效力，不受司法诉讼的推翻或修改。

各国破产法在此问题处理思路上殊途同归，立法背后保护善意第三人原则愈加突出，借款投资人作为重整程序中的善意第三人，其融资惠及各利害相关人，应当受法律最优先之保护。因此，参考国际通行的立法设计，宜在《企业破产法》第九十三条中予以补充，继续认定在破产程序转换后的借款融资优先受偿权和为重整计划的执行提供的担保依然有效。

四、结语

企业破产重整的目的在于维持债务人的营运价值并重新获得盈利能力。《破产法司法解释三》的出台，使得借款融资在破产重整领域中应用比例逐年攀升。但就总体而言，借款融资优先权的法律保障力度仍然不强，投资人长期困于投资风险高、成本收回难的窘境，势必会影响到破产重整的成功率。目前，修改《企业破产法》已列入十三届全国人大常委会立法规划。借府院联动之春风，我国也要加快“三层级”借款融资优先权制度在本国法治土壤下迅速生根发芽，用立法手段保障借款融资人获得公平合理的投资收益，以此推进破产法制度化、法治化的实施。

注释

 贺丹：《破产重整控制权的法律配置》，中国检察出版社2010年版，第125页。

 沈俊森:《企业破产重整融资法律问题研究》，西南政法大学2018年博士论文。

 尚志东 王抗：《重整期间新融资的困境与解决之道探析——从司法解释三第二条谈起》，第十二届中部崛起法治论坛征文。

 王欣新：《破产法》，中国人民大学出版社2011年版，第290页。

 樊星：《共益债务与破产法司法解释三的法律适用—基于北京京西峪鑫物资有限公司申请》，《法律适用》，2019年第12期。

 孙建：《重整融资法律制度问题研究》，南京师范大学2021年博士学位论文。

 张宇思：《我国超级优先权制度适用问题研究》，中国政法大学2021年博士论文。

 陈景善：《重整融资之超级优先权模式：功能与构造》，《政治与法律》，2021年第９期。

 杨昊：《房地产企业破产以建设施工方为主体重整融资确保款项案例退出—“以浙江 Y 房地产开发有限公司破产重整案》，《人民法院企业破产审判实务疑难问题解析》，法律出版社2016年版，第262－266页。

 联合国国际贸易法委员会：《贸易法委员会破产法立法指南》，联合国国际贸易法委员会纽约办事处，2006年，第107页、109页。

 ［美］大卫·G·爱泼斯坦、史蒂夫·H·尼克勒斯、詹姆斯·J·怀特著：《美国破产法》，韩长印等译，中国政法大学出版社2003年版，第219－220页。

 丁燕：《破产重整企业债权融资的异化及其解决》，《华东政法大学学报》，2019年第4期。

参考文献

[1]陈景善：《重整融资之超级优先权模式：功能与构造》，《政治与法律》，2021年第９期。

[2]［美］大卫·G·爱泼斯坦、史蒂夫·H·尼克勒斯、詹姆斯·J·怀特著：《美国破产法》，韩长印等译，中国政法大学出版社2003年版，第219－220页。

[3]孙建：《重整融资法律制度问题研究》，南京师范大学2021年博士学位论文。

On the Three Hierarchy Construction of Borrowing and Financing Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganization

Zhejiang Liqun Law Firm       Lin Qiuying 19941253008      Jin Dongling 17681618955

Abstract: As a financing model that obtains funds by changing the debt structure, borrowing financing has incomparable advantages. However, currently, the provisions on the priority of borrowing and financing in China's current laws are too weak, only stipulating that it can be paid off at any time by referring to the common interest debt, which cannot be prioritized over the payment of bankruptcy expenses or the payment of common interest debt. This clearly cannot meet the borrowing and financing needs of bankrupt reorganized enterprises. Based on this, by drawing on foreign legislative examples, typical cases of domestic bankruptcy reorganization financing, and practical experience of managers, a hierarchical design of China's loan financing priority system is carried out, and a three-level pyramid model with basic priority, special priority, and super priority priority is constructed. At the same time, strict restrictions will be imposed on the applicable situations at each level, and the balance concept of "restructuring promotion" and "abuse prevention" will be deeply implemented.

Keywords: Borrowing, financing, co beneficial debt, special priority, super priority

1、 Origin: Accelerating the Construction of Localized Loan Financing Priority System

In recent years, China's economy is in the transition period from high-speed development to high-quality development. In addition to the impact of the global COVID-19, the domestic economic situation is grim, the market is in a slump, and a large number of real estate, construction and other large enterprises are going bankrupt, resulting in a series of serious consequences such as unemployment of migrant workers, waste of social resources, destruction of social productivity, and social contradictions are increasingly prominent. In this situation, China has introduced many relief policies to ensure the smooth introduction of restructuring investors in the bankruptcy reorganization process, thereby alleviating the upgrading of resource allocation and social contradiction pressure. On October 23, 2019, the State Council issued the "Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment", which formulated specific prescriptions to address the chronic problem of "difficult and expensive financing". Subsequently, various regions successively introduced business environment regulations in the form of local legislation, which condensed the wisdom of local governance. In early 2020, Beijing and Shanghai respectively issued the "Beijing Municipal Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment" and the "Shanghai Municipal Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment", both of which involve asset disposal issues in restructuring and financing. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China also emphasized the need to deepen supply side structural reform and continuously optimize the allocation of existing resources. On February 25, 2021, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Supreme People's Court, and other thirteen ministries and commissions jointly issued the "Opinions on Promoting and Ensuring the Legal Performance of Managers in Bankruptcy Proceedings to Further Optimize the Business Environment", proposing to increase financing support for restructured enterprises. Banking and financial institutions should follow the principles of marketization and rule of law for restructured enterprises that meet the direction of national industrial policies and have restructuring value, Provide maximum credit support. A series of national measures have created a favorable business environment for restructuring and financing, enabling the coordination and cooperation of the "visible hand of the government" and the "invisible hand of the market", and accelerating the improvement of the socialist market economy system.

Restructuring financing refers to the financial intermediation carried out by debtors during the bankruptcy reorganization period to achieve rebirth. It has irreplaceable institutional value and practical significance in promoting enterprise revitalization, optimizing the business environment, and deepening supply side reform. From a typological analysis, restructuring financing includes but is not limited to asset financing, debt financing, and equity financing. [He Dan: "Legal Allocation of Control Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganization", China Prosecutorial Publishing House, 2010 edition, p. 125.] As a typical representative of debt financing, loan financing aims to obtain funds by changing the debt structure. Its advantages are obvious, as it has a balancing effect on financial leverage and will not affect the actual control of the enterprise.

Looking back at the history of various countries, it is not difficult to find that the legislative concept of bankruptcy law has undergone a transformation process from a creditor based approach, to a balance of interests between creditors and debtors, and finally to a social based approach. Modern bankruptcy law is no longer a civil and commercial law that only focuses on private rights, but has the economic law attribute of coupling public law and private law. [Shen Junsen: "Research on Legal Issues of Enterprise Bankruptcy and Restructuring Financing", PhD thesis of Southwest University of Political Science and Law in 2018.] Granting priority to loan financing is essentially fairness, efficiency, or balance of interests. Therefore, when constructing a localized priority system for borrowing and financing in our country, we should balance the three aspects, remove obstacles to borrowing and financing paths, actively promote the regeneration and reconstruction of bankrupt enterprises, and maintain social order harmony and stability through the rule of law.

2、 A Review of the Current Priority Rules for Borrowing and Financing in China

（1） Legal Application of Priority in Loan Financing

Article 75, Paragraph 2 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Enterprise Bankruptcy Law") stipulates: "During the reorganization period, if the debtor or manager borrows money for the purpose of continuing business, they may establish a guarantee for the loan." This paragraph does not specify the legal nature and legal status of the new loan, but only indicates that the new loan can enjoy a security right. In reality, debtors who enter bankruptcy generally have no assets to mortgage or most of their assets already have mortgages, and the establishment of new mortgage rights cannot reduce the investment risk of investors. [Shang Zhidong, Wang Kang: "Analysis of the Difficulties and Solutions of New Financing during the Reorganization Period - Starting from Article 2 of Judicial Interpretation 3", article solicited at the 12th Central Rise Rule of Law Forum. Therefore, this paragraph belongs to the principle advocacy of legislators. Before the promulgation of the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (III)" (hereinafter referred to as the "Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law"), courts and administrators usually adopt alternative measures to refer to the provisions of Article 42 (4) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to give new loans the priority of being repaid as co beneficial debts. This clause stipulates that "the labor remuneration and social insurance fees payable for the debtor's continued operation, as well as other debts arising therefrom," is one of the contents of the joint benefit debt. However, there are significant attribute differences between new loans and labor remuneration and social insurance fees, which cannot be classified together. Over time, this may lead to inconsistent understanding and application in judicial practice. Therefore, Article 2 of the Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law specifies that during the restructuring period, borrowing and financing shall be treated in accordance with the common interest debt, and the repayment order shall be inferior to the secured creditor's rights.

From the perspective of textual interpretation, Article 2 of Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law has the following characteristics compared to Article 75 (2) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law:

1. In terms of time, the loan occurrence time stipulated in this article should be after the acceptance of the bankruptcy application, breaking through the scope limit of a single reorganization period, and expanding its occurrence time from bankruptcy reorganization procedures to bankruptcy liquidation and settlement procedures.

2. In terms of repayment ranking, new loans should be treated as co beneficial debts, with priority given to their repayment, and it should be clear that they have at least priority over other ordinary debt repayment.

3. In terms of exercise procedures, the reorganization of the enterprise for borrowing and financing shall be subject to a vote at the creditors' meeting. If the debtor or manager who manages the enterprise makes an application before the first creditors' meeting, it shall be approved by the people's court. This reflects the firm implementation of the principles of creditor autonomy and legal supervision by the court in bankruptcy reorganization, and fully takes into account the urgency of borrowing and financing before the first creditor meeting.

（2） Shortcomings in current legislation

Although the introduction of judicial interpretations has clarified and resolved some urgent issues in judicial practice, there are still unresolved issues left over from history, which have also brought about some new problems worth studying, mainly in the following aspects:

From a legal perspective, loan financing is a "reference" to co beneficial debt, indicating that co beneficial debt essentially does not include loan financing. Professor Wang Xinxin believes that co beneficial debt is a general term for debts that are borne by the debtor's property for the benefit of all creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. [Wang Xinxin: Bankruptcy Law, Renmin University of China Press, 2011 edition, p. 290.] It mainly has the following characteristics: firstly, the time when debt arises is after the people's court accepts the bankruptcy application; Secondly, the purpose of bearing debts is for the common interests of all creditors; Thirdly, repayment can be made at any time from the debtor's property. Judicial interpretation separates it from common interest debt, making it difficult to be self explanatory in legislative interpretation.

2. From the perspective of priority, loan financing is superior to ordinary debt, but inferior to security interests; At the same time, the order of repayment of co beneficial debts should also be referred to. However, reference does not mean "according to". Some scholars believe that this is highly likely to open the door to solving the priority issue of borrowing and financing through market-oriented means, leaving the decision-making power to creditors. If the creditors' meeting can give potential borrowers and financiers a higher priority position, it can naturally increase the possibility of restructuring financing and also help reduce financing costs. [Fan Xing: "The Legal Application of Judicial Interpretation III on Mutual Benefit Debt and Bankruptcy Law - Based on the Application of Beijing Jingxiyuxin Materials Co., Ltd.", "Legal Application", Issue 12, 2019.] Therefore, it is worth exploring whether its priority can surpass the repayment of mutual benefit debt itself.

3. From the perspective of time nodes, the legal nature and repayment order of loans incurred in the pre restructuring process are not clearly defined. In judicial practice, some significant bankruptcy cases begin to explore the application of pre restructuring procedures, namely the linkage mechanism between out of court and in court restructuring, as an important measure to improve restructuring efficiency and asset preservation, before officially entering the restructuring process. There are no specific provisions in China's laws and regulations regarding the pre reorganization procedure, but the "Minutes of the National Court Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference" and "Minutes of the National Court Bankruptcy Trial Work Conference" actively encourage bankrupt enterprises to explore the connection mechanism between out of court and in court restructuring. Therefore, local courts have not stopped exploring the practice of pre restructuring system, such as the pre restructuring to restructuring case of Hangzhou Dongfang Cultural Park's seven companies, which was selected as one of the top ten typical bankruptcy trials of Zhejiang courts in 2021. Xiaoshan Court intervened in the legal guidance and supervision work of the pre restructuring stage in advance, supervising and guiding major matters such as debt review and the introduction of strategic investors, Using the concept of "bankruptcy without shutdown" to alleviate the problem of asset depreciation caused by shutdown, and maintain the debtor's various production factors and restructuring value. Therefore, the importance of pre restructuring is no less than that of restructuring procedures, so it is necessary to clarify the legal attributes of borrowing and financing, as well as the order of repayment, that occur in pre restructuring procedures at the legislative level.

4. From the perspective of procedural linkage, the issue of the existence or elimination of the priority of borrowing and financing in the event of restructuring failure is not clearly defined. After the reorganization plan is approved by the court, the reorganized enterprise may still be converted into bankruptcy liquidation proceedings due to inability or failure to execute the reorganization plan. The Bankruptcy Enterprise Law has not responded to the issue of whether the priority enjoyed by borrowing and financing in the reorganization process still exists in the bankruptcy liquidation process.

3、 The Improvement Path of the Priority System for Three tiered Borrowing and Financing in the Golden Tower Style

（1） Basic priority

Basic priority refers to the priority enjoyed parallel to the priority status of shared debt. It is a right derived from the definition of new loan claims as "co beneficial debts" in the Bankruptcy Enterprise Law. Due to the fact that loan financing refers to the repayment of common interest debts, the repayment order of loan financing also takes priority over employee claims, social security expenses, and ordinary bankruptcy claims. Although the Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law provides a separate interpretation of the legal attributes of new loan claims, it does not fundamentally address the category of "other debts arising from this" in the common interest debt. From the perspective of expansion interpretation, in Article 42 (4) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, "thus" can be considered as all reasonable debts incurred by the debtor for the purpose of continuing business; From the essence of co beneficial debt, it conforms to the concept of debt that is borne by the debtor's property for the benefit of all creditors. The above analysis provides a legitimate basis for the expansion of the scope of co beneficial debts. Therefore, it is advisable to adopt a summary and enumeration approach in Article 42 (4) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to improve it, clarifying that new loans and other debts, except for labor remuneration and social insurance, are co beneficial debts, which is more conducive to the logical coherence of legal interpretation.

There are no specific provisions in China's laws and judicial interpretations regarding the pre reorganization procedure. However, in recent years, with the issuance of local normative documents such as the "Guidelines for the Trial of Enterprise Reorganization Cases by the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Civil Court (Trial)" and the "Guidelines for the Handling of Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases by the Beijing Bankruptcy Court (Trial)", more and more cases have begun to explore the application of pre reorganization procedures, especially playing a significant buffering role in some major bankruptcy cases. As a transitional stage for bankrupt enterprises to officially enter the reorganization process, the urgency of the enterprise's financial needs is no less than that of formal reorganization procedures. In response, Article 128 of the Japanese Company Rebirth Law extends the exercise period of co beneficial debt to the stage after the application for reorganization proceedings and before the court's ruling. The vast majority of intermediate people's courts in China also believe that pre restructuring financing should refer to the repayment of common interest debts. Among them, the Intermediate People's Court of Suqian City, Jiangsu Province, issued Article 8 of the "Provisions of Suqian City Intermediate People's Court on Trial Trial Trial of Pre restructuring Cases", which stipulates that, During the pre restructuring period, with the permission of the people's court, the debtor may borrow money to continue operating. After accepting the restructuring application, the loan can be repaid in accordance with the provisions of Article 42 (4) of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. As relevant legal provisions on pre restructuring have not yet been introduced, referring to the above two practices, it is recommended that after meeting certain prerequisite and procedural requirements, the loan financing during the pre restructuring period should be prioritized and repaid in accordance with the common interest debt. However, the extension of time cannot be traced back to before the application for pre restructuring, otherwise it will lead to the issue of priority abuse. When the exploration of pre restructuring procedures in various regions becomes more in-depth, it can be discussed whether to define pre restructuring loan financing as co beneficial debt based on specific circumstances.

（2） Hierarchical Breakthrough of Loan Financing Priority

1. Special priority

Special priority refers to priority over "bankruptcy expenses and other shared debts". Bankruptcy expenses and co beneficial debts refer to the expenses and debts incurred after the court accepts the debtor's bankruptcy ruling, which can be settled at any time. Due to the different factors that generate the two, bankruptcy costs are a prerequisite for the operation of bankruptcy proceedings, while co beneficial debts are not necessarily incurred, so bankruptcy costs are paid before co beneficial debts.

If financing cannot be obtained even under the status of co beneficial debt, a feasibility analysis should be conducted to break through the previous priority. Fully considering the urgency and necessity of restructuring corporate financing at this time, we can draw inspiration from the legislative design of the United States and give it priority over "other administrative expenses" when certain conditions are met. Based on China's national conditions, "administrative expenses" in enterprise bankruptcy mainly refer to the additional tax and fee issues incurred by the debtor after the bankruptcy application is accepted. Based on the practice of the administrator, the administrator has been at odds with the tax authorities regarding the issue of new taxes and fees generated during the asset disposal process after the court accepts the bankruptcy application, resulting in a deadlock. There is a viewpoint that the taxes paid for the transfer of intangible assets and the sale of real estate after bankruptcy proceedings belong to bankruptcy expenses or co beneficial debts. It overlooks the second paragraph of Article 41 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which states that the applicant for bankruptcy expenses shall be the administrator designated by the court. For newly added taxes, they cannot be cut across and should be classified. They can only be recognized as co beneficial debts if they meet the criteria for co beneficial debts.

Taking advantage of the linkage mechanism between the government and the courtyard, granting special priority to borrowing and financing is in line with the requirements of socialist core values and the interests of the people. Managers should impose strict restrictions on the prerequisites and approval procedures when exercising special priority rights. The applicant should prove the existence of the following premises: firstly, loan financing is necessary and appropriate for the continuous operation of the enterprise; Secondly, granting priority to co beneficial debt still hinders access to new financing. Regarding the procedure, it must be approved by the people's court or passed by a resolution of the creditors' meeting. [Sun Jian: "Research on the Legal System of Restructuring Financing", doctoral thesis from Nanjing Normal University in 2021.]

2. Super Priority

Super priority refers to the priority that has equal or priority status compared to the priority of construction project price or secured creditor's rights in the new loan financing system, and is truly a "super priority". Unlike Article 416 of the Civil Code, in the case of chattel mortgage guarantee, it assigns priority to the price creditor's rights, and uses the price collateral itself to guarantee the payment of price collateral, achieving the coexistence of formal and substantive guarantee views. The prototype of the super priority in the new loan financing system comes from Article 364 (d) of the United States Federal Bankruptcy Code and is further improved: firstly, in terms of the nature of the debt, it does not belong to the price debt of the chattel collateral in the purchase and sale contract, but is a financial debt generated based on the loan financing assets; Secondly, in terms of priority ranking, including but not limited to chattel mortgage guarantee, it has the same priority or higher priority status as the priority of the previous construction project price or secured creditor's rights; Thirdly, in terms of application, it is limited to bankruptcy proceedings.

The priority of construction project prices is a special regulation in China, aimed at protecting the labor interests of migrant workers and prioritizing the repayment of all existing debts. The secured creditor's rights are inferior in terms of repayment compared to the construction project price, and both have priority in terms of repayment order over bankruptcy expenses, common interest debts, and other ordinary creditors' rights. The existence of super priority breaks the monopoly position of the former omnibus guarantor and helps to encourage borrowing and financing. Therefore, the introduction of this system has its practicality and legitimacy. [Zhang Yusi: "Research on the Application of Super Priority System in China", Ph.D. Thesis of China University of Political Science and Law in 2021.] However, directly granting the status of super priority in loan financing will inevitably undermine the current legal order in China and should be applied with caution. Only when the substantive and procedural requirements are met can an indirect attempt be made to grant it super priority. The substantive requirements include the following aspects: firstly, the applicant needs to prove that the bankrupt enterprise cannot obtain financing in any other way; Secondly, fully protect the rights and interests of the original secured creditor's rights and the priority holder of the construction project price, and reserve their right and means to appeal if their priority rights are damaged. In addition, the bankruptcy expenses or co beneficial debts incurred in the process of achieving super priority should have priority over loan financing in terms of repayment ranking. The reason is that such bankruptcy expenses or co beneficial debts are necessary for achieving super priority rights. If not prioritized, they will be transferred to other creditors, reducing the proportion of debt repayment, which is unfair.

For new loans with mortgage guarantees, they should still comply with China's property rights guarantee rules, which are "registration first, rights first". From this, it can be seen that there are many conflicts of interest between super priority and China's existing mortgage security property rights system. This not only significantly reduces the credit level of chattel security transactions, but also artificially shakes the legal authority of chattel security transactions. [Chen Jingshan: "Super Priority Model for Restructuring Financing: Function and Structure", "Politics and Law", Issue 9, 2021.] Therefore, it is not recommended to place new guarantees in an equal or even priority position with prior guarantees. However, restructuring enterprises does require borrowing and financing, and China's laws and regulations do not address the issue of balancing the conflict of interest between new and old security rights. Starting from the principles of fairness and efficiency, China's judicial practice has gradually explored alternative solutions. In typical real estate restructuring cases, the debtor usually has no net assets available for collateral or the collateral amount cannot cover the loan amount. In order to obtain the priority right to repayment, investors must dispose of the prior mortgage guarantee, that is, by acquiring the mortgage first, they can achieve the goal of ensuring the priority of creditor's rights before and after their investment. It should be clarified that the acquisition of mortgage rights, as a purely commercial act, is not prohibited by law. On the basis of reaching a consensus, both parties to the contract can effectively ensure the priority of the original secured creditor's rights and balance the interests of the borrower and financier. Therefore, the act of acquiring mortgage rights is equivalent to the transfer of creditor's rights in the legal sense, which has not broken through the current legal framework in terms of effectiveness. At the institutional level, it can also reflect the existence value of new loan creditor's rights taking priority over the original secured creditor's rights.

The People's Court of Qujiang District, Quzhou City, Zhejiang Province, established the priority of new loans over mortgages over the priority of construction project prices in the bankruptcy reorganization case of Y Real Estate Company regarding the issue of whether to exceed the priority of repayment of previous construction project prices. However, this is a flexible approach to solve practical problems before the promulgation of the Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law, with limited reference value. [Yang Hao: "The Case of Real Estate Enterprise Bankruptcy with Construction Party as the Main Body, Financing and Ensuring Funds Withdrawal -" The Case of Bankruptcy Reorganization of Zhejiang Y Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. "," Analysis of Difficult Issues in Enterprise Bankruptcy Trial Practice of People's Courts ", Legal Publishing House, 2016 Edition, pp. 262-266.]" Judicial Interpretation of Bankruptcy Law III The introduction of the law has broken the feasibility channel for similar cases to be replicated, but it is also a new exploration to break through the priority hierarchy through the pursuit of priority levels and the transfer of rights through negotiation. With the joint assistance of the judge and manager, negotiate with the priority holder of the construction project in advance to relinquish their priority within a certain borrowing and financing limit. If there is still a mortgage right on the loan, the borrower and financier can receive the first purchase mortgage right, and ultimately achieve the effect of borrowing and financing hierarchy analogy with super priority through a "double priority" approach.

（3） The Existence of Loan Financing Priority in Bankruptcy Procedure Circulation

In the book "Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law", the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law believes that revoking any security or priority provided for new loans in reorganization to liquidation proceedings may not be conducive to the commencement of reorganization, and suggests that national bankruptcy laws should provide for the continued recognition of any priority from new loans during the reorganization period in the event of reorganization proceedings being converted to liquidation. [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, New York Office of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 2006, pp. 107, 109.] Similar provisions exist in Article 364 (e) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code of the United States, which states that for bona fide entities providing loans, the legal effect of any priority or mortgage security rights arising during this period shall not be overturned or modified by judicial proceedings. David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nicholas, and James J. White: "American Bankruptcy Law," translated by Han Changyin et al., China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003 edition, pp. 219-220

The bankruptcy laws of various countries share different approaches in addressing this issue, and the principle of protecting bona fide third parties behind legislation has become increasingly prominent. As bona fide third parties in the reorganization process, loan investors, whose financing benefits all stakeholders, should receive the highest priority protection of the law. Therefore, referring to the internationally accepted legislative design, it is advisable to supplement it in Article 93 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, and continue to recognize the priority right to repayment of loan financing after the conversion of bankruptcy proceedings and the guarantee provided for the execution of the reorganization plan as still valid. Ding Yan: "The Alienation and Solution of Debt Financing in Bankruptcy Restructuring Enterprises", Journal of East China University of Political Science and Law, Issue 4, 2019.

References

[1] Chen Jingshan: "Super Priority Model for Restructuring Financing: Function and Structure", Politics and Law, Issue 9, 2021.

[2] David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nicholas, and James J. White: "American Bankruptcy Law," translated by Han Changyin et al., China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003 edition, pp. 219-220.

[3] Sun Jian: "Research on the Legal System of Restructuring Financing", Ph.D. Dissertation, Nanjing Normal University, 2021

4、 Conclusion

The purpose of corporate bankruptcy reorganization is to maintain the operational value of the debtor and regain profitability. The introduction of Judicial Interpretation III of the Bankruptcy Law has led to an increasing proportion of loan financing applications in the field of bankruptcy restructuring year by year. However, overall, the legal protection of the priority of borrowing and financing is still not strong, and investors are facing high investment risks and difficult cost recovery for a long time, which will inevitably affect the success rate of bankruptcy reorganization. At present, the revision of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law has been included in the legislative plan of the 13th National People's Congress Standing Committee. Taking advantage of the spring breeze of linkage between government and courtyards, China should also accelerate the "three-level" priority system for borrowing and financing to quickly take root and sprout in the legal soil of our country, and use legislative means to ensure that borrowers and financiers obtain fair and reasonable investment returns, in order to promote the implementation of bankruptcy legality and rule of law.

annotation

He Dan: "Legal Allocation of Control Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganization", China Prosecutorial Publishing House, 2010 edition, page 125.

Shen Junsen: "Research on Legal Issues of Corporate Bankruptcy and Restructuring Financing", Ph.D. Thesis from Southwest University of Political Science and Law in 2018.

Shang Zhidong, Wang Kang: "Analysis of the Difficulties and Solutions of New Financing during the Reorganization Period - Starting from Article 2 of Judicial Interpretation III", solicited article at the 12th Central China Rise Rule of Law Forum.

Wang Xinxin: Bankruptcy Law, Renmin University of China Press, 2011 edition, page 290.

Fan Xing: "Legal Application of Judicial Interpretation III on Mutual Benefit Debt and Bankruptcy Law - Based on the Application of Beijing Jingxiyuxin Materials Co., Ltd.", "Legal Application", Issue 12, 2019.

Sun Jian: "Research on the Legal System of Restructuring Financing", doctoral thesis from Nanjing Normal University in 2021.

Zhang Yusi: "Research on the Application of China's Super Priority System", Ph.D. Thesis from China University of Political Science and Law in 2021.

Chen Jingshan: "Super Priority Model for Restructuring Financing: Function and Structure", Politics and Law, Issue 9, 2021.

Yang Hao: "The Case of Real Estate Enterprise Bankruptcy with Construction Party as the Main Body and Financing to Ensure Funds Withdrawal -" Case of Bankruptcy Reorganization of Zhejiang Y Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. "," Analysis of Difficult Issues in Enterprise Bankruptcy Trial Practice of People's Court ", Law Press, 2016 edition, pages 262-266.

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: "UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law," New York Office of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 2006, pp. 107, 109.

David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nicholas, and James J. White: "American Bankruptcy Law," translated by Han Changyin et al., China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003 edition, pp. 219-220.

Ding Yan: "The Alienation and Solution of Debt Financing in Bankruptcy Restructuring Enterprises", Journal of East China University of Political Science and Law, Issue 4, 2019.

References

[1] Chen Jingshan: "Super Priority Model for Restructuring Financing: Function and Structure", Politics and Law, Issue 9, 2021.

[2] David G. Epstein, Steve H. Nicholas, and James J. White: "American Bankruptcy Law," translated by Han Changyin et al., China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003 edition, pp. 219-220.

[3] Sun Jian: "Research on the Legal System of Restructuring Financing", doctoral thesis from Nanjing Normal University in 2021.